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Everything I Know About Marriage I 
Learned from Law Professors 
BRIAN H. BIX* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The first question that should probably come to mind when a group of 
law professors—and other academics willing to be seen with a group of 
law professors—get together to discuss the meaning and future of 
marriage, as they have at the present conference, is this: What grounds 
do lawyers and legal academics have for discussing this issue at all? 
This article steps back, in part, from the current debates on marriage to 
reflect upon what special expertise, if any, lawyers and legal academics 
bring to the issues. 
II.  LEGAL ACADEMICS AND LEGAL EXPERTISE 
Of course, as citizens of this country, lawyers and legal academics 
have a right—and perhaps even a moral obligation—to offer our views 
on social and political issues of importance.  Nevertheless, our status as 
lawyers or legal academics does not seem to give us either any greater 
standing or any greater obligation regarding such public policy debates. 
 
 *  Frederick W. Thomas Professor of Law and Philosophy, University of Minnesota.  
An earlier draft of this article was presented at the “Conference on the Meaning of 
Marriage,” held at the University of San Diego Institute for Law and Philosophy, in 
January 2005.  I am grateful to commentators Robert F. Nagel and Michael Kelly.  I am 
also indebted to the other participants at the conference, as well as Dale Carpenter, Mary 
Anne Case, June Carbone, and Katherine Shaw Spaht, for their comments and suggestions. 
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Our most obvious point of special expertise is our knowledge of the 
law.  There are, of course, a number of distinctively legal issues relating 
to current discussions of marriage.  For example, whether a proper 
understanding of the United States Constitution, various state constitutional 
provisions, or prior court decisions, individually or collectively, require 
the recognition of same-sex marriages;1 questions about the application 
or constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act (DoMA);2 and choice 
of law issues raised by the recognition of same-sex marriage in 
Massachusetts.3  In particular, marriage regulation raises thorny 
problems of federalism and choice of law—matters that are often as 
mysterious to lawyers and legal academics as they are to the general 
public.  Even some prominent constitutional law experts seem to 
get badly lost when entering this thicket.  Nonetheless, while the 
interjurisdictional issues may be difficult and important for legal 
regulation of marriage, interjurisdictional issues do not usually receive 
the most attention when lawyers and legal academics discuss marriage.  
The discussion of marriage, in both the general media and in the law 
journals, touches—perhaps inevitably—on certain constitutional issues: 
what the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution 
prohibit, permit, or require.4  
There are well-known and oft-discussed problems with “constitutionalizing” 
all policy issues: in part, the danger of removing issues from 
democratic deliberation and decision-making; and in part, the 
distortion in fitting all moral and policy issues into constitutional text or 
existing constitutional law doctrinal categories.  There are aspects of policy 
decision-making that go beyond whatever rights the United States 
Constitution grants.  Further, these aspects are also beyond the arguably 
larger category of natural, moral, and human rights that individuals have 
against the state—a category that many commentators assume 
overlaps, but does not coincide with, our constitutional rights.  These 
nonconstitutional policy questions usually include questions regarding 
long-term consequences: questions that do not translate, or at least does 
 
 1. Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, 
Sexuality, and Marriage, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 27. 
 2. See, e.g., Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1309 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (dismissing 
complaint seeking declaration that DoMA is unconstitutional); Note, Litigating the 
Defense of Marriage Act: The Next Battleground for Same-Sex Marriage, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 2684, 2695 (2004) (summarizing arguments against the validity of DoMA). 
 3. See, e.g., Brian H. Bix, State Interests in Marriage, Interstate Recognition, and 
Choice of Law, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 337 (2005). 
 4. For a recent constitutional argument about prohibition that comes neither from 
the equality and substantive due process clauses nor from the federalism clauses, see 
Largess v. Supreme Judicial Court, 373 F.3d 219, 229 (1st Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 
S. Ct. 618 (2004) (holding that judicially-required recognition of same-sex marriage did 
not violate Guarantee Clause of the U.S. Constitution).   
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not translate well or easily, into rights-talk.  Such policy questions are 
prevalent in the marriage debates. 
III.  CONFERENCE TOPICS 
Whatever one might say about legal topics, narrowly understood, this 
conference seeks to discuss matters broader or more basic than the 
proper understanding of current law, or even the best way to draft future 
statutes or constitutional amendments.  Participants in this conference 
have been sent specific questions, and should consider whether lawyers 
and legal academics are well placed to answer these questions.  The  
conference invitation letter asks the following questions: 
(1) What is the state’s interest in regulating marriage? 
(2) What does the answer to (1) suggest should be the definition of 
marriage? 
(3) What does the answer to (1) suggest should be the legal 
requirements for entering and exiting a marriage? 
(4) How does the presence of children, either as a marital aim or as 
a marital reality, affect these questions? 5 
As regards the first question, why would we assume that legal academics 
have any special insight on what the state’s interests are?6  Before even 
facing that problem, one might initially note that the first question is 
deceptively difficult to even understand.  Is the question of “state interests” 
one of prescriptive political theory—what is the ideal role of the state?—or 
one of descriptive, political, or legal theory—what state interests are 
reflected in actions the current government has taken?  Or does the 
question reflect an entirely different inquiry? 
Even if one assumes that the question is one of description or rational 
reconstruction of existing practices—likely the most reasonable 
understanding—the question arises whether the focus should be on the 
surface language or rhetoric of constitutional provisions, legislative 
 
 5. Letter from Larry A. Alexander & Steven D. Smith, faculty members, 
University of San Diego School of Law, to author (Mar. 2, 2004 ) (I have every reason to 
believe that similarly-worded letters were received by the other conference participants). 
 6. As it happens, I have written articles purporting to discuss just this topic: the 
states’ interest(s) in the marital status of their citizens.  Brian H. Bix, State of the Union: 
The States’ Interest in the Marital Status of Their Citizens, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 
(2000); Brian H. Bix, The Public and Private Ordering of Marriage, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL 
F. 295 (2004).  However, I am not of the opinion that merely writing articles on a subject 
necessarily makes the author an expert on it. 
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preambles and court decisions, or whether we should assume that such 
sources are often mere propaganda, and instead derive the state’s “real” 
interests from its actions, whatever the justificatory rhetoric.7  As noted 
earlier, there is an additional complication in talking about “state” interests 
in a federal system.  Does the federal government’s interests—either 
prescriptively or descriptively understood—differ from interests of the 
state governments and the local governments? The derivation of “state 
interests” from government actions, legislative language, and federalist 
structures may be something law professors can do competently, though 
one might suppose it a task better suited for political theorists and 
sociologists. 
Lawyers and legal academics might have some special expertise on 
the second and third questions, if these questions are understood as 
questions of how governmental objectives are best translated into 
concrete legal rules and principles.  Even here, however, a larger part of 
the inquiry would likely be best left to other disciplines.  From 
observation and anecdote, lawyers and legal academics might have some 
sense of how certain objectives are best translated into legislation and 
regulation—or at least some sense, based on hard experience, on what 
not to do.  However, even on this inquiry, we are, at best, armchair theorists 
compared to the sociologists, economists, and empirical political 
theorists who can come to a more scientific view of the consequences of 
past legal norms.  Moreover, the rules of marriage entry and exit are 
perhaps as good an example as any for the limits of our expertise when 
discussing policy questions.  As the debate thrives about whether and 
how to reform rules in this area,8 even well-trained sociologists, 
economists, and political theorists have not yet reached consensus on 
relatively straightforward questions, like whether the move from fault to 
no-fault divorce rules had a significant effect on the divorce rate, a 
minimal effect, or none at all.9 
The second and third questions also raise an interesting additional 
query: To what extent are these questions distinct, and should they be?  
Some legal realists might say that “marriage” is defined by its legal 
terms—who can enter, when, with what legal consequences, and with 
what options for exit.  That is, the legal status of marriage just is whatever 
the state says it is.  Whenever the legal terms change, then marriage 
changes as well.  When jurisdictions moved from fault divorce to a 
 
 7. See infra text accompanying note 32. 
 8. See, e.g., Leslie Eaton, A New Push to Loosen New York’s Divorce Law, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 30, 2004, at A1. 
 9. See, e.g., Douglas W. Allen, The Impact of Legal Reforms on Marriage and 
Divorce, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF MARRIAGE & DIVORCE 191–211 (Antony W. 
Dnes & Robert Rowthorn eds., 2002). 
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no-fault option, marriage changed from a difficult exit to a relatively 
easy one.  This is not a generally accepted view, but the view that is 
generally accepted—that there is a practice or institution called 
marriage, that predates and underlies the (often imperfect) efforts to 
legislate about that status10—is pushing a large part of the policy debate, 
in particular, the opposition to extending marriage to same-sex couples.  
The debate about whether the definition of marriage should be seen as 
something quite distinct from its legal terms is an intriguing debate, and 
one that does have policy implications.  Yet, again, it is not clear that the 
debate is one on which lawyers and legal academics have any special 
expertise.  Though, one might add, it is not immediately clear who 
would. 
The fourth question is a basic one, and will be discussed in greater 
detail in the next section.  As will be argued then, it is not obvious that 
lawyers and legal academics have anything distinctive to add to the 
query. 
IV.  WHOSE EXPERTISE, THEN? 
Of course, to state that lawyers and legal academics may have no 
superior perspective is not to say something distinct to the policy debates 
relating to marriage: it seems largely true of most of the policy debates 
in which lawyers and legal academics intervene—and, to be sure, are 
frequently asked to do so, by the media, and sometimes by lawmakers. 
If there is a reason behind turning to lawyers and legal academics for 
policy questions, it is because of the peculiar legal culture in the United 
States.  In the United States, most major issues have, or are thought by 
some to have, constitutional implications—arguments that the Constitution, 
properly understood, requires some practice, prohibits some practice, or 
significantly restrains regulation in the area.  This possible justification for 
the role of lawyers and legal academics has already been mentioned.  
Also previously mentioned, a role hypothesizing how proposed regulations 
in an area might work out—where legal scholars’ familiarity with the current 
set of regulations, and of how past regulations in related areas have worked 
 
 10. This focus on a preexisting institution called “marriage” may also explain why 
some of those opposed to recognizing same-sex marriage do not oppose the 
establishment of “civil unions” or “domestic partnerships” for same-sex couples, even if 
such a status would carry the same legal rights and obligations currently associated with 
marriage.  See infra notes 19–20 and accompanying text. 
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out—might be a valuable contribution from legal academics.  However, 
many of the pressing questions in the marriage debates lie elsewhere. 
Much of the current debate about marriage regulation turns on claims 
regarding the short-term and long-term effects both of social practices and 
of the legal regulation of those practices: for example, whether the move 
from fault to no-fault divorce increased the rate of divorce or—slightly 
different—the commitment married people have to their marriages;11 
whether recognition of domestic or registered partnership undermined 
marriage in the countries which have such a status;12 and the relative 
effects on children for their being raised in different sorts of households 
(married, opposite-sex cohabitants, single parents, same-sex partners, 
etc.).13 
Discussions of the history of marriage are also common.14  The turn to 
history is meant to ground some broader view about marriage: either that 
it has an unchanging nature that has been realized by all societies over 
time; or that its nature has changed and evolved in significant ways over 
time.15  The “unchanging” view might ground a Burkean conservative 
argument that traditional institutions have developed the way they have 
for good reasons—they likely serve important societal functions that 
could not be served equally effectively by an alternative—and one 
removes such an institution or alters it radically only at a strong risk of 
doing significant harm.16 
 
 11. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 9, at 191–211. 
 12. Compare Stanley Kurtz, The End of Marriage in Scandinavia: The 
‘Conservative Case’ for Same-Sex Marriage Collapses, THE WKLY. STANDARD, Feb. 2, 
2004, at 26 (arguing that registered partnerships have undermined marriage in 
Scandinavia), with William N. Eskridge, Jr. et al., Nordic Bliss? Scandinavian 
Registered Partnerships and the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 2004 ISSUES IN LEGAL 
SCHOLARSHIP art. 4, http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss5/art4/ (taking a contrary position). 
 13. E.g., Jennifer L. Wainright et al., Psychosocial Adjustment, School Outcomes, 
and Romantic Relationships of Adolescents with Same-Sex Parents, 75 CHILD DEV. 1886 
(2004). 
 14. Again, I am as guilty as many others.  See Brian H. Bix, Reflections on the 
Nature of Marriage, in REVITALIZING THE INSTITUTION OF MARRIAGE FOR THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 111–19 (Alan J. Hawkins et al. eds., 2002) (discussing the history 
of marriage in the context of evaluating positions in the current marriage debates). 
 15. Historical works frequently cited include LAWRENCE STONE, ROAD TO 
DIVORCE: ENGLAND 1530–1987 (1990); NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF 
MARRIAGE AND THE NATION (2000); HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: A 
HISTORY (2000).  See E. J. GRAFF, WHAT IS MARRIAGE FOR? (1999), for a recent effort 
(by a nonhistorian—though in this case not a legal academic) to call upon the history of 
marriage to justify legal reform to recognize same-sex marriages. 
 16. See generally EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 
(1790). 
It is important to note that even if one accepts the view of marriage as a long-standing 
institution for which there are Burkean reasons not to modify, this need not be the end of 
the argument.  For example, one could argue that while there may be a presumption 
against modifying long-standing institutions, that presumption might be overcome by 
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Legal academics tend to recycle the historical scholarship we can get 
our hands on—inevitably more often the popularized versions of 
serious scholarship—without being in a position to distinguish good 
work from poor work.17  In this, of course, legal scholars are no worse 
than other participants in the public policy debate—politicians, cable 
news commentators, newspaper columnists, and the like—and probably 
do a good deal better.  Most legal scholars, unlike others involved in the 
debate, at least make an effort to cite actual scholarly work, even if it 
may sometimes be more controversial and more out-of-date than we 
realize.  However, that still leaves us as secondhand and second-rate 
compared to actual historians.  To whatever extent that historical research 
is relevant to the question of how marriage should be regulated today, 
should that part of the question not be left to historians? 
Of course, one difficulty with leaving historical claims to historians—and 
it exemplifies a problem with interdisciplinary work generally—is that if 
most legal scholars are not well versed in history, it is equally true that 
most historians may not be well trained to discuss legal matters.  This 
tends to leave the field to the handful of scholars who can claim to have 
substantial training in both law and history—which might be okay if 
there were more of them and if their collective interests and expertise 
extended to all the topics on which a historical understanding of the law 
was sought.  However, there is probably not that sort of “critical mass” 
of interdisciplinary scholars. 
One also comes across legal academics offering biographical or 
autobiographical stories trying to explain what it is like to be in a certain 
 
strong countervailing reasons of justice to modify where the long-standing institutions 
arguably oppress or exclude a group unfairly.  See JONATHAN RAUCH, GAY MARRIAGE 
160–71 (2004). 
 17. For example, it is common for legal scholars working on the history of 
marriage and divorce, including the present author in his prior works, to cite to the work 
of the English historian Lawrence Stone.  However, Stone’s reputation in the field of the 
history of family law is, to put it charitably, controversial.  Consider the following 
backhanded compliment appearing in his obituary in The Times (London): “It is unlikely 
that there will be an enduring Stone interpretation in many or any of the fields he 
worked . . . but he provoked many to think about the history of private life in a new 
way . . . .” Obituary: Lawrence Stone, THE TIMES (London), June 21, 1999, at 23. 
Although I am raising, or at least reporting, doubts about the value of Professor 
Stone’s work in this area, I do not wish to cast any aspersions on other works cited 
earlier.  In particular, I think the work of Professors Hartog and Cott, cited supra note 15, 
reflect just the sort of work that should be informing the marriage debates.  Of course, 
this still leaves open the question of the ways in which legal scholars can and should use 
that work within their own scholarship. 
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position in this society relative to marriage regulation: for example, a 
homosexual seeking legitimation or state benefits for that writer and his 
or her same-sex partner, or discussing the day-to-day difficulties that 
come with not being able to marry.  This sort of presentation—meant to 
help others not similarly situated to learn more about the context of the 
debate and to gain some empathy for those seeking reform—is generally 
more common within critical race theory and feminist legal theory, and 
has been labeled “narrative scholarship.”  Whatever the advantages and 
disadvantages of such writings, or their merits as “legal scholarship,”18 
one thing that seems relatively clear is that there is little reason to 
believe that legal academics have either more significant personal stories 
to tell or are better at telling such stories than are others.  At best, legal 
academics may just have the advantage of more numerous places to 
publish.  To be fair, while there may be examples of narrative or 
autobiographical snippets in the legal academic contributions to the 
marriage debates, they are relatively rare compared with such contributions 
to other policy debates. 
At times within the marriage debate, what seems necessary is not a 
legal analysis, but a psychological one.  For example, policy makers might 
want to hear cogent explanations for why both the President19 and much 
of the public20 can strongly oppose same-sex marriage, but simultaneously 
accept—or at least not strongly reject—offering same-sex couples 
identical or nearly-identical rights and benefits under a rubric like “civil 
unions.”  Legal academics could offer theories about this, too, but legal 
scholars are not likely to be experts on how or why someone can hold this 
seemingly inconsistent grouping of positions. 
Some legal scholars have published work on the economic analysis of 
marriage: on the decisions relating to entering and leaving marriage, and 
the likely effects of current or proposed legal regulation on those 
decisions.21  Here, there are two objections or questions that might be 
 
 18. Compare, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 
971 (1991) (praising narrative scholarship), with Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, 
Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807, 854 
(1993) (raising doubts about narrative scholarship). 
 19. See, e.g., Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Says His Party is Wrong to Oppose Gay 
Civil Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2004, at A21. 
 20. See, e.g., USA Today/CNN/Gallup Poll Results, USA TODAY, Nov. 22, 2004, 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/polls/tables/live/2004-11-22-poll.htm (poll result showing that 
32% of people support civil unions while 21% support same-sex marriage); David 
Brooks, The Value-Vote Myth, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2004, at A19 (“[I]n . . . exit polls . . .  
25 percent of the voters supported gay marriage and 35 percent of voters supported civil 
unions.”). 
 21. See, e.g., THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF MARRIAGE & DIVORCE (Anthony W. 
Dnes & Robert Rowthorn eds., 2002).  The important initial work in this field is GARY S. 
BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (enlarged ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1991).  Becker 
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raised: first, whether the legal scholars who conduct economic analysis 
are doing it well or correctly, or whether, instead, this is a matter that 
should be left to economists; and second, whether economic analysis is 
valuable in that it does more good than harm.  The second question is 
difficult—but I do not think the answer is obviously “no”—I leave it to 
others, or at least to another time, to discuss that question more fully.22  
As to the first question, it seems that today, unlike a decade or two ago, 
law and economics does not suffer as much from “amateur” efforts,23 
though these do occur from time to time.  Many of the legal academics 
working in this field have doctoral degrees in economics or otherwise 
have significant training in the area.  Thus, economically-trained legal 
academics likely have something substantial to offer to marriage debates 
in general, though, as already discussed, it is unlikely that they would be 
able to offer complete or conclusive responses to the conference 
questions. 
None of this is to assert that legal scholars have little to add to the 
marriage debates.  Some of the legal expertise relevant to the debates 
comes simply from familiarity with legal analysis, including knowledge 
of bodies of case law relevant to the questions being considered.  For 
example, when the question arises of a state’s “interest” in marriage, as 
mentioned in the conference questions, law professors knowledgeable in 
family law, constitutional law, or civil procedure know that this “interest” 
could be either direct or indirect24—“indirect” here exemplified by the 
holding that a state court has the power, or jurisdiction, to impose 
alimony on an out-of-state spouse, because the in-state spouse seeking 
alimony was only in the state after being sent there by the out-of-state 
spouse.25  A commentator could certainly come to this conceptual distinction 
 
is an economist, but many of the contributors in the Dnes & Rowthorn collection are  
legal academics. 
 22. I have touched upon the question in Brian H. Bix, How to Plot Love on an 
Indifference Curve, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1439 (2001); see also Brian H. Bix, Engagement 
with Economics: The New Hybrids of Family Law/Law & Economics Thinking (Mar. 1, 
2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=263192. 
 23. By contrast, I think that there is still too high a percentage of amateur, and 
amateurish, efforts in both “legal philosophy” and “legal history.” 
 24. On this topic generally, see Brian H. Bix, State of the Union: The States’ 
Interest in the Marital Status of Their Citizens, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (2000). 
 25. See Hines v. Clendenning, 465 P.2d 460, 463 (Okla. 1970).  In Hines, the court 
stated, referring to an earlier U.S. Supreme Court decision allowing state jurisdiction for 
a citizen’s suit against an out-of-state insurance company: “The ‘manifest interest’ of the 
State of Oklahoma in the marital status, and financial relief incident thereto, of its 
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between “direct” and “indirect” interests without any legal training, but 
experience with the “applied ethics” of legal decisions—especially 
the hundreds, if not thousands, of cases one becomes familiar with in 
the course of legal education, legal practice, and preparation for 
teaching—can make such conclusions easier to reach. 
Another topic in which legal academics are relatively expert is the 
way that family law doctrine and practice may seem to instantiate a 
different understanding of state views and purposes than one might get 
from listening to the rhetoric of political and media debate.  To put the point 
a different way, official actions frequently belie public proclamations.  It 
is not that this divergence between rhetoric and practice shows fraud; at 
times, decisions reasonable at the time can have consequences not fully 
intended or fully welcome by the officials who made the decisions, but 
the consequences are there nevertheless.  For example, officials may 
speak at length about the obligations spouses owe one another, but rarely 
mention that such obligations are generally unenforceable.  Courts rarely 
order someone to support his or her spouse within an intact marriage,26 
and will not impose a fine or award damages if the duty is violated.  
Failure to support would likely ground a fault-based divorce in 
jurisdictions that still have fault-based divorce; however, this is a minor 
victory, given the availability of divorce on no-fault grounds.  The only 
small way in which some states punish breaches of marital duties is that 
some, but far from all,27 states allow consideration of marital fault in 
making property division and alimony decisions.28 
 
residents, is surely as great as the interest of California in providing effective redress for 
insurance policy beneficiaries residing within its borders.”  Id.  
 26. The standard citation for this nonconstitutional doctrine of “family privacy” is 
McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336, 342 (Neb. 1953), where the court refused to order 
the husband to give greater support to his wife in an intact marriage. There are a few, but 
highly exceptional, cases that allow an award of maintenance despite the marriage’s still 
being intact.  See Coltea v. Coltea, 856 So. 2d 1047, 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).   
For evidence that medieval ecclesiastical courts would sometimes grant orders of 
“specific performance” during an intact marriage, see R. H. HELMHOLZ, MARRIAGE 
LITIGATION IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 67 (1974) (discussing specific enforcement of 
marriage contracts, including orders “that the defendant accept the plaintiff as his 
legitimate spouse and treat her with marital affection”); R. H. Helmholz, Canonical 
Remedies in Medieval Marriage Law: The Contributions of Legal Practice, 1 ST. 
THOMAS L.J. 647, 651 (2003). 
 27. Some states expressly hold that marital fault may not be used as a factor in 
dividing property or setting alimony obligations.  See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
5/503(d) (West 1999 & Supp. 2004); MINN. STAT. § 518.58 (2004). 
 28. The relationship of marital fault and child custody is complex, and varies 
significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction—and often, it seems, from judge to judge.  
However, the trend appears to be towards discounting claims of marital misbehavior or 
personal immorality, short of domestic violence, unless or until it can be shown that 
those actions or tendencies directly affect the person’s ability to be a fit parent.  See, e.g., 
MINN. STAT. § 518.17 subd. 1(b) (2004) (“The court shall not consider conduct of a 
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Additionally, many state rules regarding who may marry and what 
rules will govern dissolution are easily circumvented.  For example, 
under traditional choice of law rules, a person could marry in one state 
with the general expectation that the marriage would be recognized as 
valid in any other state, at least for opposite-sex marriages29—thus, 
avoiding some state policies codified in the marriage-entry rules of that 
individual’s home state.30  A person can even obtain a divorce in a jurisdiction 
different from where he or she married or where he or she lived during 
the marriage, as long as the petitioner establishes domicile in the new 
jurisdiction;31 and the jurisdiction hearing the divorce generally applies 
its own laws, even if that state had little prior connection to the couple or 
the marriage.32  The resulting divorce judgment is enforceable in all 
other jurisdictions.33 
Finally, there are substantive positions in this debate that turn on a 
sharp, or sharper, distinction between legal marriage—or, if one prefers, 
the legal recognition of marriage—and the civil, social, or religious 
views of the institution.34  Obviously, such a position needs to be 
grounded on a clear articulation of what legal recognition of marital 
status entails, and an explanation for why it can and should be separated 
from social or religious views about who can marry and what follows 
from marital status. 
 
proposed custodian that does not affect the custodian’s relationship to the child.”). 
 29. See EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS § 13.5, at 564–66 (4th ed. 
2004) (providing that a heterosexual marriage in one state will be recognized by other 
states).  This is subject to limited exceptions based on “public policy” and, in a handful 
of states, “marriage evasion legislation.” Id. at 570–80. 
 30. There are some limits, in some states, on the ability to circumvent state laws 
and policies.  See id. (discussing marriage-evasion rules and public policy grounds 
supporting them). 
 31. Many jurisdictions also have residency durational requirements, so the 
petitioner may have to wait (in many such jurisdictions) six months or a year after 
moving to a new domicile to file.  See Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review of 
the Year in Family Law: Children’s Issues Remain the Focus, 37 FAM. L.Q. 527, 580 
(2004) (“Chart 4,” listing residency duration requirements for all states). 
 32. See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 29, § 15.4, at 630–31. 
 33. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (the Full Faith and Credit Clause); Williams v. 
North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 301 (1942) (holding that full faith and credit applies to 
divorce decrees). 
 34. See Mary Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758 (2005) 
(analyzing the distinction between legal recognition of same-sex marriage and civil, 
social, and religious views on same-sex marriage). 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
This article raises questions about the extent to which legal scholars 
have anything special to add to the current debates about marriage.  To 
be sure, having no special expertise on some matter has rarely stopped 
legal scholars from writing—or law journals from publishing—long 
articles.  However, it is valuable to at least reflect on the question of 
relative expertise, to consider on which aspects of these debates legal 
academics are likely to have the most to add, and which aspects are 
better off deferred to others. 
 
